The De-Googling Checklist Is Missing a Step: Your SIM
The short version
- GrapheneOS fixes the application layer: what apps and Google can learn from your phone.
- It cannot fix the network layer. Your SIM identifies you to the carrier, your IMEI is sent to every tower, and the towers log where you are. The GrapheneOS project says this itself.
- Encrypted DNS and a VPN or Tor cover the traffic side. The name on the line is the piece no OS setting can touch. That one is decided when you choose the SIM.
The Checklist Everyone Follows
Ask anyone who has de-Googled a phone what they changed and you get the same list. It is a good list. It just stops one layer short.
| Layer | The usual swap | On most checklists? |
|---|---|---|
| Operating system | GrapheneOS on a Pixel | Yes |
| Browser | Vanadium, Tor Browser, Mullvad Browser | Yes |
| App store | F-Droid, Obtainium, Accrescent | Yes |
| DNS | Encrypted Private DNS | Yes |
| Email and chat | An encrypted mail provider, Signal | Yes |
| The SIM | Still the one from the carrier store, registered to your legal name and billed to your home address | Almost never |
The phone in your pocket can be the most hardened Android build in existence and still sit on a line that tells an operator exactly who you are and roughly where you are, all day.
What GrapheneOS Actually Fixes
It is worth being precise about how much GrapheneOS does, because it is a lot. Everything below is on the device, between your apps, the OS and Google:
- Google with no special access. Play services run as an ordinary sandboxed app, only in the profiles where you install them.
- Permissions stock Android does not have. A Network toggle per app, a Sensors toggle, and Storage and Contact Scopes that hand an app only what you pick.
- Wi-Fi privacy. A new random MAC address every time you connect, so a cafe network cannot recognise you next week.
- Data at rest. Isolated user profiles whose keys are purged when you end the session, automatic reboots that put a locked phone back at rest, and a duress PIN that wipes the device.
- Exploit resistance. A hardened memory allocator, stronger sandboxing, and an LTE-only mode that removes a large amount of radio attack surface.
The practical walkthrough of each of these is in GrapheneOS privacy settings that actually matter.
What It Says It Cannot Fix
GrapheneOS is unusually honest about where its protection ends. These lines are from the project's own FAQ:
- “GrapheneOS always considers networks to be hostile and avoids placing trust in them.”
- “Cellular networks use inherently insecure protocols and have many trusted parties.”
- “Connecting to your carrier's network inherently depends on you identifying yourself to it”
- “Airplane mode is the only way to avoid the cellular network tracking your device”
- “Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone.”
The FAQ also answers the question people raise next: “Yes, the baseband is isolated on all of the officially supported devices.” That is real protection, but it runs in one direction. Isolation keeps a compromised modem away from your apps and data. It does not change what the modem says to the tower. The baseband is a separate processor running its own firmware, and its whole job is to identify your phone to the network.
So the honest summary: GrapheneOS stops your phone leaking to apps and to Google. It cannot stop it leaking to the carrier. The carrier half is bought, not flashed.
What the Carrier Still Sees, Piece by Piece
Here is everything the network side can still record about a fully hardened phone, and what, if anything, you can do about each item.
| What the network sees | Why | Can the OS change it? | What you can do |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscriber identity (IMSI) and the name on the account | The SIM has to authenticate to get service at all | No | Use a line that was never registered to you |
| Device identity (IMEI) | Sent by the modem to every network it attaches to. It survives wipes, new SIMs and new operating systems. | No | Treat a phone that has carried your named SIM as already linked to you. For a clean split, use a separate device. |
| Location (which towers can hear you) | That is how calls and data find you. The logs add up to a location history. | No | Airplane mode when it matters. Otherwise, make sure the history is attached to a line with no name. |
| DNS lookups | Every site you visit starts with a lookup, often to the carrier's own resolver | Yes | Set Private DNS to a provider's hostname so lookups are encrypted and leave the carrier's resolver |
| Destinations (IP addresses, hostnames in the TLS handshake) | Encryption hides the content, not where it is going | Partly | A VPN or Tor so the carrier sees one tunnel, not your browsing |
| The payment trail | Whoever sold you the line knows how you paid | No | Pay with a method that does not carry your name |
Two of those rows are fixed in Settings. The other four are decided by the SIM you buy, the phone you put it in and how you pay. No amount of flashing reaches them.
Adding the SIM to the Checklist
Pick a line with no name on it
The single biggest change. A line bought with no account, no email and no ID means the carrier's records point at a SIM profile, not at you. Around 150 countries now require ID to register a local SIM (see the list), so in most places that means a data eSIM sold without registration.
Pay without your name
A card payment puts your name back on the purchase. Monero hides amounts and addresses at the protocol level, and Lightning payments are not written to a public ledger. On-chain Bitcoin is permanent and public, so it is the weakest of the crypto options. See paying with Monero and paying with Lightning.
Install it without Google
Turn on Settings > Network & internet > eSIM support and install from the QR code or activation code with the built-in SIM manager. GrapheneOS documents that eSIM management does not depend on Google Play and won't connect to a Google service unless the carrier uses one. Step by step: GrapheneOS eSIM setup.
Encrypt the traffic metadata
Set Private DNS to a named provider, and run a VPN or Tor for anything you would not want logged against the line. The SIM decides whose name is on the record. These decide how much is on it.
Keep your named number for what needs it
You do not have to give up your real number. Keep it for banks and family, and use the unnamed line for data, sign-ups and travel. An eSIM-capable Pixel holds several profiles, so this is compartments on one phone, not two phones.
Remember the IMEI
If this exact phone spent years on a SIM registered to you, the network has already seen its IMEI next to your name. For everyday privacy that is fine: the new line still keeps your browsing and location off a named account. For a threat model where the two must never be linked, start the new line on a device that never carried your old one.
What This Does Not Do
An unnamed line does not hide your location from the network, does not encrypt anything, and does not help once you sign in to accounts under your real name. It removes one identifier, the most permanent one most people carry. If your phone number is not what identifies or links you, you may not need this at all, and better habits will do more.
The step most checklists skip
Data eSIMs in 190+ countries with no account, no email and no ID. Pay with Monero, Lightning or Bitcoin. Installs on GrapheneOS with no Google Play.
FAQ
Does GrapheneOS stop my carrier from tracking my location?
No, and the project says so itself. Your phone has to identify itself to the cellular network to get service, and the network always knows which cell towers can hear it. GrapheneOS's own FAQ puts it plainly: airplane mode is the only way to avoid the cellular network tracking your device. What you can change is whose name that location history is attached to.
Isn't the baseband isolated on GrapheneOS?
Yes. On officially supported Pixels the baseband is isolated from the rest of the system, so a compromised modem has a much harder time reaching your apps and data. Isolation protects the phone from the modem. It does not change what the modem tells the network: the SIM still authenticates, the IMEI is still sent, and the towers still log the connection.
If I put an anonymous eSIM in my Pixel, am I anonymous?
You are anonymous to the extent the line is the thing that identified you. A line with no name, no account and no ID breaks the link between the carrier's records and your legal identity. It does not hide your location from the network, it does not encrypt your traffic, and it does not help if you then log into accounts under your real name. The IMEI also matters: if the same phone previously carried a SIM registered to you, the network has already seen that device next to your name.
Do eSIMs work on GrapheneOS without Google Play?
Yes. Turn on Settings > Network & internet > eSIM support (it is off by default) and install the profile from a QR code or activation code with the built-in SIM manager. GrapheneOS documents that eSIM management does not depend on Google Play and does not connect to a Google service unless the carrier itself uses one.
What does PikaSim see when I buy an eSIM?
A payment identifier and a pseudonymous key. No account, no email, no name, no ID. If you pay with Monero or Lightning there is no public ledger entry pointing back to you either. The field-by-field list is in our Chat Control explainer.
Sources
- GrapheneOS FAQ, cellular tracking and baseband isolation: grapheneos.org/faq
- GrapheneOS usage guide, eSIM support and LTE-only mode: grapheneos.org/usage
- GrapheneOS feature overview: grapheneos.org/features
- What PikaSim can see, field by field: Chat Control explainer